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The limitations of bargaining models of MNC-host
country relations
A good deal of the current discussion on the
relationship between multinational corporations and
the peripheral State in the area of natural resources1
is framed in terms of models of bargaining. Such
models identify two actorsthe MNC and the 'host
country'whose behaviour is assumed to be utility-
maximising and whose interests, while conflicting,
are seen as not necessarily incompatible. They then
proceed to ask questions such as, What are the
possible joint-maximisation outcomes in the inter-
action? What is the bargaining strength of the
actors? and How do different bargaining strategies
affect the outcome? Two main strands within this
approach can be identified: one, which has been
labelled 'static', is based on game theory and the
theory of bilateral monopoly (Moran, 1974: 158ff;
Mikesell, 1971: 40ff); another, which is dynamic and
more influential, is discussed in this article.
The basic variables in the dyhamic bargaining model
of foreign investor-host country relations in
natural resources are: the bargaining assets of both
actors; their perceptions of goals and possibilities of
achieving them; their knowledge of the substantive
elements of the relationshipi.e. the operation of the
extractive industry in questionand of the bargain-
ing process itself; and the way in which all three-
power, perspectives and knowledgechange in a
more or less predictable manner.
Whether applied to the operation through time of a
single concession, or to the various relationships
between the host government and foreign investors,
or to general trends in the terms of new concessions,
the model suggests that at the beginning of the
relationship it is the foreign investor who is in a
position of strength through his control over capital,
technology and markets; he is also keen to use his
advantage in order to get maximum privileges in
view of the risk involved in committing substantial
capital to a venture that he perceives uncertain both
in terms of its economic profitability and its political
life expectancy. On the other hand, the host
government's eagerness to put the country's natural
1 For purposes of the present discussion, natural resources'
refers to petroleum, hard minerals and other non-renewable
resources.
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riches to good use is matched only by its acute
awareness of its inability to do so without the
foreign investor. Hence the 75-year concession, with
no serious obligations for the investor. However, as
soon as operations startas soon as the prospective
deposit is confirmed as economically valuable, oil
starts to flow or minerals to surface, and profits begin
to showthen the bargaining strength position is
reversed and the perspectives change. It is now the
investor, who has sunk his capital, who is more or
less at the mercy of the host government: he can be
taxed, subjected to regulations of various kinds and
in the last resort expropriated. The risk has,
furthermore, either disappeared or been considerably
reduced, and the government begins to find the
original terms of the concession excessive. It is at this
point that the government will request and, if
necessary, impose a revision of the terms. When next
time round the same or another investor is called
upon to expand the operation, or to extend it
downstream into more processing, or to introduce
new technology, the relative power positions and the
corresponding perspectives are reversed again, only
to swing back once more when the investment is sunk
and profitable.
The process, however, is not simply cyclical. For
one thing, the advantages of the international firms
generally have a tendency to be eroded through time,
as technology becomes standardised and dissemi-
nated, patents expire, capital markets develop and
become more competitiveincluding 'aid' markets
and production and marketing know-how becomes
available on a for-hire basis. For another, each host
government undergoes a cumulative learning process
on the basis of its own experience in successive
negotiations, of diffusion of relevant knowledge
generally and, perhaps less commonly, of sharing
bargaining experience with other host governments.
The government becomes increasingly capable of
handling the foreign investor and indeed the
industry itself, and its bargaining strength is
commensurately higher. Finally, cumulative trends
affect the perspectives of the host government in the
direction of emphasising the need to change to its
advantage the terms of the relationship with the
foreign investor: the inevitable growth of contact
between the foreign enclave and the economy and the
legal system of the country makes for difficulties and
tensions that require adjustment; fiscal budgetary
needs associated with development call for an
evergrowing claim on the proceeds of the foreign
operation; and the sense of dependency that the
latter creates fosters feelings of nationalism.
So, the model predicts that the cyclical and
reciprocal pattern of strength and weakness for the
foreign investor and the host government will be
reflected in the changing terms of their relationship
through time, but within an overall cumulative trend
for the host government to increase its share of
benefit from the relationship. (Moran, 1974: 157-69;
Vernon, 1967: 81-90, 1971; Mikesell, 1971: 35ff;
Smith and Wells, 1975)
The preceding explanation is valuable in that it
helps demystify the notion of the sanctity of the
concession contracts: by emphasising the power
context in which they are initially entered into and in
which they operate, it exposes their fallacious claim
to moral and legal immutability. This assessment is
especially significant considering that the main
exponents of this approach are committed supporters
of capitalism and, on the whole, of the multinational
enterprise as a vehicle of progress and development.
Further, it goes some way in helping to understand
the changes that are taking place in the international
political economy of natural resources in the 1970s.
Its weakness lies in its failure to relate the abstract
power and learning processes it describes to the
concrete contemporary development of the world
capitalist system and its implications for the natural
resource industries. It does not place the relations
between foreign investors and host governments
within the context of the changing relations between
the centre and the periphery of the capitalist system,
and their 'internal' expression in the latter. Thus, the
objectives and interests of the foreign investors
appear unrelated to those of the larger system of
which they are a part, as well as to the particular
national objectives and interests of their individual
home economies and governments. Conversely, it
assumesqua model, i.e. as far as the generalisable
and predictable behaviour of the actors is concerned-
that the host countries are homogeneous actors
trying to maximise through time the benefits to the
local economy deriving from foreign investment, and
progressively achieving this goal through a strength-
ening of their bargaining power and their knowledge.
Such an assumption, while rightly pointing to the
bargaining assets available to, and the learning
process undergone by, the governmental decision-
makers involved as significant variables, impover-
ishes the analysis by excluding systematic reference
to the internal structure and development in those
countries; the changes in the economic infrastructure,
in the class structure and in the political forces of the
periphery of capitalism as they relate to the
development of the capitalist system world-wide. 2
It can, however, be argued that the basic elements for
understanding the contemporary international pol-
itical economy of natural resources in terms of the
emergence of nationalism in the underdeveloped
world and the responses of international capital are
given by understanding the structural changes that
have taken place both in the centre and in the
periphery of the world capitalist system after World
War II. To these we shall now turn our attention.
A historico-structural approach
It is of course well known that the world capitalist
system experienced a major restructuring after the
Second World War, in response both to tendencies
that had appeared before the conflict and to
developments resulting from it. Several of those
major changes have a direct impact on the
international political economy of natural resources.
To begin with, the trend towards increased
dependence of the industrialised world on industrial
raw materials from the underdeveloped countries is
being countered by another trend inherent in the
capitalist mode of production: that towards the
development of the productive forces and technical
progress which was further accelerated by the
requirements of the war economy. This has resulted
in a tendency for the raw material content of the
finished product of the industrialised economies to
decline, as the technological content tends to
increase; jt has also made possible a massive
expansion in the use of synthetic substitutes, most
notably plastics, thus further reducing the need for
natural resources generally (in relative terms).
Technical progress has, moreover, contributed to
reducing the need for industrial raw materials from
the underdeveloped world by increasing the
availability of them in the developed countries.
Advances in the techniques of exploitation of low-
grade ores have transformed hitherto neglected areas
of the industrialised world into economically viable
conventional mineral deposits, as is the case with
copper reserves in the United States, Canada and
Australia, for instance. Unconventional sources of
minerals and metals are being explored, such as sea-
bed manganese nodules, that appear to be a
potentially important source of nickel, among other
materials, and high-alumina clays, that can replace
2 Not that the internal structures of the host countries are
ignored; it is, though, that they seem to be regarded as
unsusceptible of theoretical treatment, Le. of systematicinclu3ion in the model in a way that will allow some pre-
dictability of behaviour. The references to these factors in
the best analyses are, therefore, more or less casual, as in
Vernon 1967: 193-201, or explicitly relegated to the em-
pirical description of specific cases, as in Moran (1974 : 170).
To include these elements in a theoretically meaningful way
would require adopting some sort of general theory of the
origins, dynamics and development of modem capitalist
society. This fundamental epistemological choice is an in-
tellectually risky step that most non-Marxist analysts of
capitalism do not seem prepared to take.
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bauxite as a source of aluminium and are abundant
in the United States. Significant improvement has
also been achieved in the recovery and re-cycling of
used metal; the great bulk of the potentially reusable
metal of the world is, of course, in the industrialised
countries. The general trend has been reinforced by
the emergence of the United States as the centre of
the capitalist system. The US is comparatively more
self-sufficient in natural resources than the European
countries, and although its net requirements of
natural resource imports seem to have grown as a
percentage of domestic consumption, for a number
of materials the opposite is actually the case.
This is not meant to suggest that the developed world
no longer needs primary products from Africa, Asia
and Latin America; a substantial part of the
industrial raw material requirements of the developed
economies still come from the so called Third World,
and in one crucial area-that of energy-the degree
of dependency has, if anything, increased in recent
years.3 The point is that we are assuming that the
concrete behaviour of various agents in the capitalist
system (firms, governments) is determined in the last
analysis by the logic of the system as a whole, and
that the latter will express itself not in spite of, but
rather, through the contradictions, counter-tenden-
cies and circumstantial determinations that the
process will exhibit at any given point in time. The
relative reduction of the dependence of the
industrialised world as a whole on underdeveloped
countries' raw materials points to a trend in the logic
of operation of capitalism in the period under
consideration and is therefore a necessary part of the
explanation of concrete empirical phenomena which
does not exclude major variations in the degree of
self-sufficiency of various developed economies
(Japan, for instance, is singularly lacking in most
industrial raw materials), and periods of intense
competition for privileged access among governments
and firms.
TABLE 1
United States: Expenditure in New Plant and
Equipment in the Mining and the Communication
Industries as Percentages of Total Expenditure
(five-yearly averages)
Source: Survey of Current Business
3 Oil is, however, in many respects an exceptional case, because
of the distribution of world reserves, the absence of sub-
stitutes, its perishable character and the fact that many of
the technological innovations that save in other materials
require more energy than traditional technologies or are
themselves based on petro-chemical derivates; even in oil,
of course, the search is already en for new sources and
substitutes, and there is little doubt of the likelihood of
important oil-saving technologiçal innovations in the long-run.
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One of its expressions is a shift in the locus of capital
accumulation away from the extractive industries and
towards the technology intensive sectors of
manufacturing and service industries, a point
illustrated in Table I which shows the relative
decrease in US domestic expenditure in new plant
and equipment in the mining industry in the period
1950-74, and compares it with the spectacular
increase of expenditure in the communications
industry for the same period. A parallel decrease is
shown by available figures on capital expenditure in
mining and smelting by US firms in the under-
developed countries.4 This reflects not only the well-
known general shift of US foreign investment from
mining and smelting towards manufactures, but also
the decrease in US investment in mining in
underdeveloped countries as compared to investment
in mining in other developed countries (Tables 2 &
3). For capitalism as a whole, therefore, the mining
and smelting industries in the underdeveloped world
have lost their primary interests as outlets for
capital accumulation, while retaining importance as
physical sources of industrial raw materials. This
points to possible conflicts between central govern-
ments, Interested primarily in access to supplies, and
individual capitalists, interested in a continuous flow
of profits.
TABLE 2
Value of United States Direct Investment Abroad in
Mining and Smelting
(percentages, selected years)
Source: Survey of Current Business
TABLE 3
US Direct Investment Abroad: Distribution of Net
Capital Outflows and Undistributed Subsidiary
Earnings in Mining and Smelting
(percentages, ten-yearly averages)
Source: Survey of Current Business
4 The time series of percentages of US net capital outflows
plus undistributed subsidiary earnings corresponding to
mining and smelting in underdeveloped countries for theperiod 1950-74 shows a declining trend as measured by a
least square regrewion line. The regression constant is 6.8709
and the regression coefficient is -0.2860. The original data
was obtained from the Survey of Current Business.
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1974
Developed
countries 31.4 45.5 48.4 53.8 59.1 65.7
Underdeveloped
countries 68.6 54.5 51.6 46.2 40.9 34.3
1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74
Mining 4.5 4.4 3.3 2.5 2.6
Communications
6.0 8.0 9.6 10.0 12.9
1950-59 1960-69 (1970-74)
Developed countries 50.6 72.3 (90.1)
Underdeveloped
countries 49.4 27.7 (9.9)
The development of contemporary capitalism has
also created the conditions for a redefinition o!
centre-periphery relations in natural resources that
can satisfy the individual capitalist. As the
contemporary agent of world capitalist expansion is
the vertically integrated multinational corporation,
the individual capitalist has acquired the ability to
transfer the locus of profits from one stage of the
productive process to another, and to recapture the
capacity to derive monopoly rents by concentrating
on the stages where it retains monopoly control over
technology. In addition, new forms of surplus
extraction have been developed that can satisfy
nationalistic feelings in the underdeveloped world
without effecting any significant changes in the
international sharing of surpluses or in the effective
control over the industry internationally. The most
important of these are:
Joint ventures with the host State, with varying
proportions of equity distribution. Irrespective of the
percentage owned by the host State, such joint
ventures often incorporate the feature that the
partner in charge of the management of the
operation, as well as the marketing of the product, is
the foreign corporation. The distribution of profits
on the basis of the shared equity is often offset by the
privileged tax and duty regime accorded the joint
venture, where the foreign partner would normally
also have special rights in terms of repatriation of
profits and income tax on distributed dividends.5
The emergence of service contracts with foreign
companies, even in the absence of any equity
participation. These may refer to the management of
the operation, or the procuring of inputs from
abroad, or the international sales of the product, or
the provision of technology, engineering, etc., or
combinations of these. Through these arrangements
the MNC can retain control over the industry and
secure for itself a flow of surplus which is not
necessarily less than what its profits would have been
had it been the owner of the operation. In fact, it is
becoming apparent that these are the preferred
formats for the operation of MNCs in the field of
natural resources in the underdeveloped world.
(Proceedings of the American Society for Inter-
national Law, 1973: 227-45; Smith & Wells, 1975).
Packages of finance and technology for new
investment linked to sales of the future products of
the venture at privileged prices. This is a particularly
good solution for MNCs that are integrated
downstream, such as US oil companies. Agreements
for the privileged supply of products to former
5 There is wealth of literature on joint ventures in under-
developed countries. See W. Friedmann et. aI. 1971 and
Wells Jnr., 1970.
owners also feature prominently in contemporary
nationalisations of natural resource industries.
The State and nationalism in natural resources
This analysis suggests that the underlying trends of
the operation and expansion of capitalism after the
Second World War appear to favour the emergence
of forms of nationalism in natural resources in the
underdeveloped world. This is not to imply that
conflict will not take place whenever such nationalism
asserts itself, as those MNCs involved, whose
activity may be directly curtailed as a result, will no
doubt derive little comfort from learning that the
process is in line with deeper trends in the
development of capitalism, and will on the contrary
fight against nationalistic attempts. As suggested
above, however, the basic trends help understand
and predict the reaction of capitalism as a whole and
of the governments of the central countries, as
representatives of national capitalist classes. Equally
crucial for the assessment of the conflicts that may
occur and their likely resolution is the real meaning
of nationalist resource policies in terms of the
politico-economic projects and structures of political
and social dominationwithwhich they are associated.
The most general framework in which to approach
the latter is by looking at the reasons for the
emergence of a 'natural resource ideology' through-
out the Third World in the 1960s and 1970s. This has
expressed itself in international declarations such as
the 1962 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(proposed by Chile and supported by most
developing countries at the time) and the initiatives
of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries that
resulted in the Declaration and Programme of Action
on the New International Economic Order (UN
General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202
(S-VI), May 1, 1974) and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (UN General Assembly
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), December 12, 1974). A
curious feature of this phenomenon is the fact that it
cuts across enormous differences in the economic,
social and political structures of the countries of
Asia, Africa and Latin America, in the political
projects advanced by their ruling sectors and in the
political alignment of their governments in the world
arena. Aside from the fact that at least some of this
unanimity is explainable in terms of the ineffectual-
ness of the initiatives so far, other factors are also in
operation. The development of the productive forces
in the periphery of world capitalism and their
corresponding effects in the level of the class struggle
and in the political superstructure have given impulse
to the emergence of anti-system movements that
represent truly nationalistic projects and that cannot
be completely ignored even in contexts in which the
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domination of groups co-opted by international
capitalism is well established. Some of those sectors
were constituted and/or strengthened in the struggle
for colonial independence in Africa and Asia in the
1960s. From the viewpoint of the dominant classes,
particularly in countries where natural resource
industries represent a substantial sector of the
economy, the needs of capital accumulation call for
an increasing share of the surplus generated by the
industries to be captured by the State; this process is
not contradictory, indeed it is functional, with the
insertion of the peripheral economy in the
international circuit of capital through direct
investment in the manufacturing industries. The role
of the State in such cases may range from that of
simply providing the essential infrastructure and
supporting local capital that performs a subsidiary
role to the dynamic expansion of the manufacturing
MNCs, to a more direct participation in the process
of capital accumulation, including the area of natural
resources. The experience of the OPEC countries has
no doubt strengthened the resolve of dominant
sectors in the periphery whose purpose is not to
break ties with world capitalism but rather to
increase their share in the distribution of surplus
coming from natural resources among other things to
tighten the integration of their economies in world
capitalism through foreign investment in other areas.
A whole range of possibilities thus appear as
concerns the policies of peripheral States towards
natural resource MNCs, from those that are designed
only marginally to alter the international sharing of
surplusirrespective of the rhetoric with which they
may be presentedto truly revolutionary attempts to
break away from dependency in natural resources.
Any concrete analysis of the relationship between the
State in Latin America and the natural resource
MNCs must therefore incorporate an examination of
the nature of the State in the various countries
considered, with a view to illuminating its concrete
class character and the societal project that the
dominant sectors are putting forward. More
specifically, the following elements may help to
clarify the real significance of various government
policies for natural resource MNCs and the limits
that such policies have:
1. Role, actual and/or potential, played by natural
resource industries in the generation of surplus value
that can be profitably capitalised. How dynamic is or
can be the natural resource sector in the process of
capital accumulation? Indicators would be the export
y. domestic importance of the natural resource
industries and their exchange revenue earning
importance; the size of resource reserves; the
linkages with the local economy; and the possibilities
of downstream integration at the national level.
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Degree of differentiation of the productive
structure and the corresponding differentiation of the
class structure. What is the nature of the dominant
classes? Are they agrarian oligarchies, financial,
commercial or industrial bourgeoisies, or combi-
nations thereof? What is the degree of autonomy of
State bureaucracies? Conversely, what is the class
composition of the popular sectors, and what their
political expression(s)?
What is the nature of the societal project of the
dominant class? Is it an attempt to break away from
dependency ties with the world capitalist system, or
to redefine a convenient form of insertion in it along
the lines offered by the contemporary process of
internationalisation of capital? What is the role
assigned to the State in the process of accumulation?
The following paragraphs will offer a very tentative
first approximation to applying this type of analysis
to the question of the relationship between the State
in Latin America and the MNCs in natural resources.
Some Latin American illustrations
Many of the major initiatives to redefine the
relationship between the State and natural resource
MNCs in Latin America in the 1960s originated in
countries undergoing a process of industrialisation
essentially activated by direct foreign investment but
also with a substantial element of local capital
accumulation and the consequent emergence of a
national industrial capitalist sector, linked to the
foreign sector; with a State with a certain degree of
autonomy, given by the presence of a strong
bureaucracy that can in some instances arbitrate
among the various fractions of the dominant class;
and with popular movements with a strong
nationalistic ideological content. Given that the basic
politico-economic project of the dominant sectors
was one of reinsertion in the world capitalist system,
rather than of adopting a non-capitalist path, the
extent of the redefinition of the relationship with
natural resource MNCs becomes a question of
balancing the need to increase the local share of
surplus and satisfy nationalistic sentiment with the
need not to break away from the international capital
circuit. The results range all the way from purely
formal changes with minimal effect on either surplus
sharing or control, to somewhat deeper
restructurings.
Mexico, 1961
An early instance in the decade was the Mexican
mining law of 1961. This essentially restricts the
granting of mining concessions to companies the
majority of whose capital is in the hands of Mexicans.
While no provision was included to alter the
ownership status of current concessions (which could
have continued in foreign hands for up to 25 years
after the law) extraordinary tax privileges were
granted to Mexican controlled companies, amount-
ing to a reduction of 50 per cent of the net federal
portion of production and export taxes, and the
right to request further reductions under special
agreements. In view of the amount of the tax
concessions most foreign-owned companies pro-
ceeded quickly to negotiate sales of majority
interests to Mexican investors. By 1965, control
of all major companies (except two sulphur com-
panies) had been acquired by Mexicans (Wright,
1971: 139-40)
Several elements are worth noting in this instance.
First, in 1961 the Mexican mining industry was
producing for the domestic market to a much
larger extent than usual in Latin America. In fact,
demands for Mexicanisation grew apace with the
growth of domestic demand as industrialisation
began in the late 1940s. By the end of the 1950s
between one-fifth and one-fourth of production
was being consumed by Mexican industry; it was
the Mexican large industrialist sector that pressed
for Mexicanisation in order both to have a share
in the growth of the mineral industry and, most
importantly, to be able to integrate upstream
(Brothers, 1970: 16). While one manifest aim of the
measure was to attract many small Mexican in-
vestors into the industry, as one observer notes
"finding Mexican buyers for their shares (was)
extremely difficult for foreign companies trying to
comply with the Mexicanisation requirements,
and with very few exceptions, control of the im-
portant mining companies has passed from a large
number of foreign investors into the hands of a
small group of Mexican owners" (Wright, 1971: 140)
The true meaning of the new regime was, therefore,
to transfer surpluses to the local large capital-
ists, not at the expense of the MNCs but rather of
the State. "Earnings on the minority interests
received by the foreign companies appear to be at
least as large as those realised before Mexicanis-
ation, reflecting not only tax benefits but also
various fees charged the new joint ventures under
management and technical assistance contracts
with the former parent companies. Moreover, the
funds received from Mexican investors have gen-
erally been invested in highly profitable industrial
enterprises . . . presumably considerable dividends
to the new domestic entrants into mining have
been realised by integrating their industrial activi-
ties with raw material sources" (Brothers, 1970: 17).
The mining law of February 1976 has not subs-
tantially changed the situation, which is one in
which mining MNCs can operate without sig-
nificant restrictions and with a highly privileged
tax, profit-remittance and autonomy regime, pro-
vided a part of the surplus generated is trans-
ferred to the local capitalist sector (LAER, 1976).
Not surprisingly, Industrial Minera Mexicana-
formerly American Smelting and Refining Company
announced, after the law became effective, that
it would, invest $300m in expanding its silver,
copper, zinc and coal operations' in Mexico (LAER,
1976).
Chile, 1967
The other major attempt at redefining the rela-
tionship between natural resource MNCs and the
State in Latin America in the 1960s was the
'Chileanisation' of the copper industry carried out
by the Frei Government in Chile in 1967-69.° The
'context here was, of course, entirely different from
the Mexican experience. In 1964, when nego-
tiations with the American MNCs started, the
Chilean economy was stagnating, after the exhaus-
tion of the import substituting process had led
to a halt in investments both by local capital and,
despite the generous terms offered by the conser-
vative Alessandri administration, also of foreign
investment. In particular, the US copper companies
refused to embark on any major new projects as
they felt their tax regime was excessively onerous.
Copper, on the other hand, was a crucial sector
for capital accumulation; 95 per cent of produc-
tion was exported, generating about 75 per cent
of foreign exchange. The Frei Government wanted
capitalist development for Chile based on the
modernisation of agriculture and the transfer of
surpluses from agriculture to industry; strong
participation of the State both in creating the
conditions for industrial capitalist accumulation
and in the accumulation process in the basic in-
dustries; and attracting private foreign investment
particularly in the manufacturing sector, as well as
massive US aid and credit under the Alliance for
Progress. Further, it had redistributive aims, in
line with the fact that the support for Frei's Chris-
tian Democratic Party included important sectors
of the peasantry, the urban proletariat and the
'marginal' sectors; to this one must add the presence
of a strong Marxist opposition pressing for both
redistributive and nationalistic measures. Both
the project, therefore, and the ideological context
required an effective increase in the State share of
copper revenue.
This, however, was to be accomplished not so much
by means of increasing the share of the State in the
existing levels of revenue but rather by means of a
major investment programme that would increase
6 The best comprehensive dicusjon of the Itrei copper policies
in English is Moran, (1974), which further includes a useful
bibliography.
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production and revenue substantially over a five-
year period. The presence of American MNCs was
regarded as essential to the securing of finance for
the programme and to its implementation, as was the
necessity to offer adequate incentives for their
continuing involvement. The solution was to set
up joint ventures by means of the purchase by the
State of a 51 per cent interest in the existing oper-
ations,7 and to grant the new joint companies a
very favourable tax regime. that would compen-
sate the American MNCs for their divestment of a
majority of the equity. The American companies
would, furthermore, be in charge of the manage-
ment of the operations, the procuring of imported
inputs and the sales of copper in the world market,
although the State would retain a supervisory role
through its majority presence on the Boards, and
would gradually increase its participation in the
operational functions. In practice, therefore, the
American MNCs retained effective control over
the industry, and their share of the surplus remained
basically unaltered in relative terms, while in
absolute terms (due to a large increase in the world
price of copper in 1967-69) it increased dramatically.
This, in turn, led to a resurgence of nationalistic
feeling in various sectors, including within the
government party, which in the last months of the
Frei Government pressed for a further redistri-
bution of profits in favour of the State (through a
preferential dividend in its favour when the price
exceeds a certain level). If we relate this experience
to some of the concepts suggested above and
compare it with the Mexican case, the differences
become apparent. In the Chilean case, the attempt
was aimed at gaining for the State a quantum of
participation (more apparent than real at the
beginning but with a potential for growth) in an
industry of crucial importance for the process of
capital accumulation in the economy generally, and
at increasing its share of the surpluses through an
acceleration of that process in the industry (as well
as satisfying nationalistic aspirations among popular
sectors both in the -government party and in the
opposition). All this without antagonisingin fact
to a large extent at the request ofthe American
MNCs who would remain crucial actors in the
process for some time to come. Full-scale national-
isation of the copper industry by the Allende
Government in 1971 impeded, of course, the
consolidation of this particular form of restruc-
turing of State-MNC relations.
The 1970s
This model of interlocking relations between the
State and MNCs in natural resource industries has
7 For an analysis of the form of the jcint venture arrangements,
see Novoa 1972 chas. 1-9.
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become the prevailing one in the 1970s in those
Latin American countries whose dominant sectors
are bent on introducing a kind of dependent capital-
ist model of development. The forms this inter-
locking takes and the extent of actual State par-
ticipation in the control and the surplus absorption
vary. When, in Venezuela, the political project of
the dominant sectors includes an element of popular
mobilisation in a context of democratic politics,
and where mineral resources constitute by far the
most crucial and dynamic sector for capital acc-
umulation, the policy is one of nationalisation, aimed
at satisfying nationalistic sentiments and at in-
creasing in real terms both State control and
surplus extraction. However, in the case of the oil
industry both concrete technical limitations in the
ability to operate and expand the industry and to
market the product, and the more general limits
imposed by the need to remain in the international
circuit of capital call for service agreements
with the MNCs, whereby marketing of the
oil is in the hands of the former owners (Exxon.
Shell and Gulf); they furthermore provide tech-
nology to the nationalised companies, for which they
are paid a flat fee per barrel of production. The
compensation bonds are redeemable only in oil; the
nationalisation law also allows for the creation of
joint ventures, both in new and in existing oper-
ations, a provision that was bitterly fought against
by the united opposition in Congress (LAER,
1976A). The regime of the nationalised iron industry
is essentially similar to that of oil in these respects.
In the case of the military authoritarian regimes,
the approach towards MNCs in natural resources
varies according - to the political project of the
power bloc, and in particular, in terms of
the role assigned to the State in the process of
capital accumulation. Brazil, the most consol-
idated of such regimes and whose hegemonic
power bloc includes what has been called a 'State
bourgeoisie' (Cardoso, 1975) seems to be a case in
which the State will retain a significant degree of
participation, and in some cases, control over
natural resource industries. - Thus, the normal
format offered to foreign investors in minerals
is that of joint ventures with State majority part-
icipation (Business Latin America, 1976: 366). In
the case of oil, while exploration has been opened
to foreign concerns, the draft contracts offered
seem to safeguard the formal ownership of Petrobras
over the fields and installations, while allowing for
the signing of service contracts and the existence of
production-sharing along lines similar to the
Indonesian oil contracts (LAER, 1976B: 76).
At the other extreme, the Chilean military regime,
whose view of development involves a much more
secondary role for the State, has apparently re-
verted to an open door policy for new ventures in
copper, and has also opened oil exploration (until
1974 a State monopoly) to MNCs. This may well
simply express the temporary predominance within
the dominant sectors of the thinking of the Chicago
school of economics, and may conceivably be
reversed towards a more assertive role for the
State in the process of capital accumulation when
the limitations of the present economic project
became intolerable. Significantly, the military
have maintained the nationalisation of the existing
large scale copper industry effected by Allende,
although they have paid substantial compen-
sation to the former owners (Fortin, 1975: 23-29).
A word is needed about the Allende experience of
natural resource MNCs. The Unidad Popular
model entailed a break with the American MNCs
within an attempt to introduce structural changes
in a socialist direction. Thus, copper was nation-
alised without compensation; control over both
production, sales and purchases of imported inputs
and over surpluses was assumed in full.8
The American MNCs embarked thereupon on an
international offensive of legal and commercial
sabotage, but one that was largely ineffective in
disrupting the production or marketing of Chilean
copper. It is difficult, of course, to assess the degree
of success of the companies' offensive independ-
ently from the effects of the US government's
blockade of the Chilean economy and its 'des-
tabilisation' action, which were instrumental in
determining the overthrow of Allende. It is now
clear, though, that the decision of the Nixon admin-
istration to prevent the success of the Allende
experiment in Chile by whatever means necessary
was adopted independently of the conflict between
Allende and the US copper companies, such that a
solution to the latter would probably not have
altered the basic resolve of the US government to
work for the overthrow of the Popular Unity
government. (United States Senate, 1976) In a
number of respects, furthermore, the Chilean case
was unique, in that it was always clear that the
industry did not require the presence of the American
MNCs either for the operation of the mines, or for
marketing the copper. Even so, the policy of the
Allende government was one of regarding the copper
sector as the generator of surpluses that would finance
the rest of the experiment; therefore the line taken
was a cautious one, in which no dramatic changes
were introduced either in the way in which the
operation was run or in its system of external
relations: the marketing arrangements under the
nationalised regime remained essentially the same
8 For a general discussion of the nationalisation of copper by
the Allende Government, sec Novoa, (1972). On the inter-
national aspects, C. Fortin, forthcoming.
as when the American MNCs acted as sales agents.
New ventures were invited internationally, both in
copper and in other natural resources, but with
arrangements that did not involve direct foreign
investment or foreign control; the preferred arr-
angement was the kind that linked finance for a
project to the future sales of the product in normal
commercial terms. Despite the bad publicity that
the expropriated American copper MNCs were
able to create for the Allende government, capi-
talists in both Western Europe and Japanand
indeed, to some extent in the United Stateswere
prepared to come to Chile and invest under the
terms offered by the Allende government.
The Allende experience with the American copper
companies shows, therefore, that at least under
certain assumptions regarding ability to operate
the industry, a peripheral government can effect a
break with natural resource MNCs without dis-
rupting the industry concerned. The disting-
uishing feature here was, of course, the nature
of the political project for Chile that Unidad Popular
was trying to implement. And it is also the nature of
that projectmore than the conflict with Anaconda
and Kennecottthat explains the ultimate des-
truction of the experiment by the combined forces
of internal reaction and US intervention.
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